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1 Introduction and Background 
1.1 Background 
It is believed that the problem pertaining to tax avoidance can be traced back as far as the 
existence of taxation.
1
 Tax avoidance activities reduce and compromise the trustworthiness and 
equitableness of the tax system.
2
 Governments in most if not all jurisdictions are confronted with 
a serious issue  of combating or containing tax avoidance and because of this most of these 
jurisdictions have introduced a statutory mechanism known as the general anti- avoidance rule 
(GAAR) as a primary measure to target avoidance arrangements.
3
 
Tax avoidance is on one hand broadly speaking concerned with the conduct that is prima facie 
lawful, but that results in tax benefits that are considered unacceptable. The term tax avoidance 
can be a very deceptive concept.
4
  This can partly be attributed to the fact that tax avoidance is on 
the face of it legal and yet somehow unacceptable in certain instances.
5
 Thus far, one clear 
distinction to be drawn is that the concept of tax avoidance is legal in nature.
6
 
Tax avoidance was previously seen as the permissible way in which a taxpayer could take 
advantage of the law to lessen liability to taxation.
7
 However the position today is quite the 
opposite as most governments look upon many avoidance arrangements with a level of disregard 
which was once reserved for tax evasion.
8
 
One clear challenge established thus far, is the distinction between tax avoidance 
considered acceptable on one hand and tax avoidance considered unacceptable on the 
other hand. Therefore precisely which activities are intolerable is a subject on which 
logical intellects can and do disagree.
9
 Tiley submits that, whether something is 
                                                          
1
 Krishna, V. Tax avoidance: The General Anti-Avoidance Rule (1990) 8, Carswel. 
2
 Review of Business Taxation. A Tax System Redesigned: More Certain, Equitable and Durable (1999) 7. 
3
 Atkinson, C. General Anti-Avoidance Rules: Exploring the Balance between the Taxpayer’s Need for Certainty and 
the Government’s need to prevent Tax Avoidance (2012) 14 (1) at p.1. 
4
 Ibid, p. 3. 
5
 Orow, N. General Anti-Avoidance Rules: A Comparative International Analysis (2000) 61, Jordans. 
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 Bowler, T. Countering Tax Avoidance Schemes in the UK: Which Way Forward? (2009) 10, Tax Law Review. 
9
 See note 3 at p.5. 
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permissible or not, is a resolution and not a test‟ and hence it simply rehashes the 
problem.
10
 In Hadlee and Sydney Bridge Nominees Ltd. v CIR
11
 President Cooke 
recognizes that while the contrast can be hard to attain on particular facts, it is both 
definitive and appropriate for some purposes.  
In the case of Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures v CIR
12
 the contrast was contemplated to be 
unhelpful and it was contested that the distinction can assist both in recognizing of 
actions that are acceptable and those that are unacceptable, and also to make clear factors 




Taking into consideration that the main objective of a GAAR is to attack unacceptable and 
not tax planning or mitigation, it is within reason that it must include tests definitively or 




Tax avoidance is best defined in the case of CIR v Willoughby, where it was expressed by 
Lord Noran that: 
 
The hallmark of tax avoidance is that the taxpayer reduces his liability to tax without 
incurring the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by any 
taxpayer qualifying for such reduction in his tax liability. The hallmark of tax 
mitigation, on the other hand, is that the taxpayer takes advantage of a fiscally 
attractive option afforded to him by the legislation, and genuinely suffers the 
economic consequences that Parliament intended to be suffered by those taking 




In view of this, a taxpayer who takes advantage of the options granted to him/her by the 
statute in reducing his/her tax liability, such a taxpayer is well within the law if he suffers 
certain economic consequences as intended by Parliament for choosing such an option.  
                                                          
10
 Tiley, J. Revenue Law 6
th
 ed. (2008) 102, Hart Publishing 
11
 (1991) 13 NZTC 8116, 8122. 
12
 [2009] 2 NZLR 289, 328 [95]. 
13
 MacNiven v Westmoreland Investments *2001+ STC 237 *62+ (Lord Hoffmann): Lord Walker, ‘Ramsay 25 Years 
on: Some Reflections on Tax Avoidance’ (2004) 120, Law Quarterly Review 412, 416. 
14
 See note 3 above at p.6. 
15
 [1997] 4 All ER 65, 73. 
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However where a taxpayer uses an option in a manner not intended by Parliament it is 
considered impermissible and unlawful.   
 
Provisions of the general anti-avoidance rules will not apply to a taxpayer who genuinely utilizes 
the provisions of the tax statutes to reduce his tax liability as this will fall within the ambit of 
acceptable tax avoidance. For instance a taxpayer can take advantage of and claim all 
expenditure which is incurred in the course of his trade in terms of section 11 (a) and 23 (g) of 
the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
 
The Income Tax Act
16
 also contains other specific provisions designed to counter tax avoidance 
schemes whose sole or main purpose is to avoid taxes. Examples of some of these provisions are: 
 The deeming provisions under section 7 (1) – (11)17 which provides for circumstances 
when income is deemed to have accrued or to have been received by a taxpayer; 




Tax avoidance schemes which are not subject to specific anti-avoidance provisions are dealt with 
under the general anti-avoidance rules currently contained in section 80A to 80L of the Act
19
. 
The previous regime of anti-avoidance rules was provided for under the now repealed section 




On the other hand the term evasion is used to denote a taxpayer who derives a benefit by 
reducing his tax liability or avoid paying taxes entirely using means which are illegal.  
                                                          
16











Evasion involves not paying the correct amount of tax under the ordinary provisions of the law,
21
 




Historically, the distinction between tax avoidance and evasion provided both the starting point 
and the conclusion of the inquest – if an arrangement was considered to be the evasion of a 
liability to taxation, it was illegal and ineffective.
23
 By contrast, those actions that avoided 




1.2 Outline of Research problem 
Tax avoidance which has a negative impact through the loss of revenue for governments has 
over a number of years risen significantly. This problem does not only affect South Africa but 
affects most world governments. The clear effects of tax avoidance include:
25
 
 Reduction of government revenue making it difficult for the executive to implement 
some of the social and economic needs; 
 The integrity of the tax system is threatened; 
 And the equity of tax system is undermined. 
 To combat tax avoidance most governments including South Africa have formulated statutory 
rules known as GAAR. It has been established that the legitimacy of the system of law relies 
largely on the permissibility of the processes and methods employed by individual laws.
26
 It is in 
view of this that the validity of the GAAR is questionable in that the rule of law requires that a 
good law should be capable of being clear, certain and predictable, elements which the GAAR 
clearly lacks. It has been established that laws which fulfill the characteristics of clarity and 
certainty are known to provide its subjects with the ability to comply with the law, and the 
                                                          
21
 United Kingdom, Royal Commission on the Taxation of  Profits and Income , Cmd 9474 (1955) 
22
 OECD, International Tax Terms for the Participants in the OECD Programme of Cooperation with Non- OECD 
Economies (OECD, 2007). 
23




 See note 3 at p. 5. 
26
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoregiae (1274), I-II, 18, iv. 
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maximum freedom to act within the boundaries set by the legislature.
27
 In 1776 Adam Smith 
highlighted that the four canons of taxation are, equality, certainty, convenience and economy 
and in relation to certainty, he noted that: 
The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and not arbitrary. The time 
of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to 
the contributor, and to every other person. Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the 
tax is put more or less in the power of the tax gatherer… The certainty of what each 
individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance that a very 




In a concurring view, the OECD committee on Fiscal Affairs stated that taxpayers have a right to 
a high degree of certainty as to the taxation consequences of their tax affairs.
29
 Still on the issue 
of certainty, the study group appointed by the United Kingdom government on the possibility of 
introducing a GAAR also highlighted taxpayer certainty as a major issue to be considered in 
drafting an appropriate GAAR for the UK.
30
 
Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the GAAR, the courts have also not been of much 
help in formulating decisive tests to determine when an arrangement or transaction is an 
acceptable or unacceptable avoidance behavior.   
1.3 Rationale for the study 
The rationale of this study is to examine the perspective and reaction of the judiciary to tax 
avoidance in South Africa in comparison to the selected jurisdictions.   
The other objectives to be considered by the study are: 
 To evaluate the responsibility or role of the courts towards tax avoidance; 
  To examine whether the presence of the GAAR has provided certainty in tax avoidance 
cases;  
                                                          
27
 Raz, J. The Rule of Law and its Virtue (1977) 33, Law Quarterly Review 195, 204. 
28
 Smith, A.  An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the  Wealth of Nations (1776) (1990), Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 405-6, cited in British Columbia Railway v The Queen (1979) 79 DTC 5020, 5025 
29
 OECD, Taxpayer’s Rights and Obligations: A Survey of the Legal Situation in the OECD Countries (1990), OECD, 
[2.21]. 
30
 Aaronson, G QC. GAAR Study (2011), UK Treasury [3.13]. 
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 To establish the judiciary‟s viewpoint to date on tax avoidance; and 
 To establish whether case law has advanced so as to conclusively anticipate arrangements 
or transactions which are acceptable or unacceptable tax avoidance behavior? 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
The study will seek to establish answers to the following specific research questions: 
 Is the GAAR effective enough to combat tax avoidance? 
 Is the judiciary accomplished enough to deal with the issue of tax avoidance?  
 Is the attitude of the judiciary more favorable to taxpayers or the fiscus on tax avoidance?  
 Has case law advanced enough so as to specify exactly which arrangements or 
transactions constitute acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance behavior ? 
 Has the GAAR clearly defined what acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance behavior 
is? 
 
1.5. Literature review 
Literature to be reviewed in this study will include various works of eminent writers and case 
law on the subject. Tax avoidance is a problem which affects most if not all jurisdictions 
including South Africa. 
South Africa and Australia among them, have formulated a statutory mechanism known as 
GAAR to counter arrangements considered to be unacceptable avoidance behavior. On the other 
hand countries such United Kingdom do not have this broad spectrum statutory mechanism but 
depend on various statutory provisions contained in various statutes known as TAAR’s and the 
common law doctrines formulated by the courts.  
This study recognizes the fact that most governments‟ source of income including South Africa 
is derived from taxes.
31
 According to the Review of Business Taxation, tax avoidance activities 
minimize government income and erode the integrity and equity of the tax system.
32
 
                                                          
31
 Arendse, J.A,. et al. Silke on South African Income Tax (2003). 
32





 state that the state through revenue authorities collects the funds from the 
taxpayers which it administers for the benefit of its subjects. However it is of importance to note 
that this process of correcting taxes by the revenue authorities is met by serious challenges 
through taxpayers who devise sophisticated schemes to avoid the payment of taxes. 
The gravity of tax avoidance was highlighted by the Minister of Finance Pravin Gordhan in the 
2010 budget speech, who stated that vigorous tax avoidance is a grievous cancer consuming into 
the fiscal base of many developing countries.
34
  
Atkinson submits that the problem of combating tax avoidance is encountered by many world 
governments and because of this;- many jurisdictions have introduced a statutory GAAR as a 
primary mechanism to target unacceptable avoidance behavior.
35
 
Judith Freedman has however noted that despite the presence of the GAAR in Canada and the 
absence of it in the United Kingdom, the courts have in both countries arrived at almost similar 
conclusions on the application of the general principles of tax avoidance.
36
 Therefore at face 
value a conclusion to be drawn is that the presence or absence of the GAAR will give rise to the 
same effect. 
It has also been observed that , notwithstanding the existence of the GAAR in countries such as 
Canada, the Supreme Court is seemingly more conventional in its viewpoint than the more recent 
tax avoidance decisions of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom where there is no GAAR
37
.  
Chris Evans has submitted that many cases recently decided in the United Kingdom have 
provided disappointing outcomes to revenue authorities and further asserts that there has been 
remarkable headway in the principles that lead the courts to make the decisions concerning tax 
avoidance and that there is certainty in the approaches that the courts are likely to take in 
statutory interpretation of the anti-avoidance legislation.
38
 
                                                          
33
Huxham, K. & Haupt, P. Notes on South African Income Tax (2010) p.2 
34
 www.treasury.gov.za/documents/2010/speech/speech2010.  
35
 See note 3 above at p.1 
36




 Evans, C. Barriers to Avoidance: Recent legislative and judicial developments in Common law jurisdictions (2006). 
8 
 
Sonnenbergs observed that much as the taxpayer is to take advantage of the tax statute so as to 
minimize his tax liability at what point does the activity ceases being legitimate tax planning and 
become tax avoidance which the law should prohibit?
39
 
In addressing the difficulties confronted with the concept of tax avoidance, Pagone points out 




Much as it is recognized that the primary role of the judiciary is to interpret law, it is also 
commonplace as Ian Saunders affirms that the responsibility of the court is twofold: the first 
been to formulate their own doctrines and secondly to interpret the statutes. He further points out 
that the judicial approach to counter tax avoidance must act as a guide the revenue authorities.
41
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
This research study will be conducted by way of a desktop study with a main focus on literature 
review. Prominence will be given to the relevant legislation, applicable case law, policy 
documents and works of eminent writers of text books, journal articles, newspaper articles and 
magazines. A short focused comparative study will also be undertaken to determine how other 
jurisdictions have dealt with the tax avoidance.  
The main focus of this research is to evaluate the statutory mechanism to counter avoidance 
specifically the GAAR and case law in South Africa in comparison to that of Australia and the 
United Kingdom to be specific. 
The primary source of reference is relevant tax laws followed by judicial precedents and works 
of eminent writers. Preference for materials gathered for this research shall take the form of 
repute granted to the author, publishers of such study and authenticity of the journal or magazine 
in which such an article is published. 
                                                          
39
 Sonnenbergs, EN. Anti-avoidance 1733 Acceptable tax planning (2009) 118. 
40
 Pagone, C. T. Tax Avoidance in Australia (2010), Australia, Federation Press, ch. 1. 
41





1 General overview of tax avoidance 
The main focus of this chapter is to discuss the general principles underlying tax avoidance 
focusing tax planning or mitigation, impermissible avoidance and the evasion of tax. The issue 
regarding tax avoidance can be quite intricate particularly when drawing a distinction between 
acceptable and unacceptable avoidance behavior
42
. Therefore it is of absolute importance to 
examine the principles of tax avoidance in totality so as to appreciate the difficulties encountered 
by the law makers and the judiciary when formulating laws and undertaking adjudication 
respectively. 
The concept of tax avoidance is best discussed by looking at other concepts which are closely 
connected to it. The starting point should therefore to distinguish tax avoidance with the three 
broad related concepts which SARS has also identified. These are, legitimate tax planning or tax 
mitigation, impermissible tax avoidance and tax evasion.
43
 While tax avoidance can be easily 
distinguished from tax evasion, the distinction between tax planning and tax avoidance has been 
a difficult one. 
According to SARS Discussion Paper on tax avoidance, tax avoidance is best approached by 
looking at the following extract from Practice Note No. 6: 
A taxpayer who has carried out a legitimate tax avoidance scheme, i.e. who has arranged his 
affairs so as to minimize his tax liability, in a manner which does not involve fraud, 
dishonesty, misrepresentation or other actions designed to mislead the Commissioner, will 
have met his duties and obligations under the Act if he fully and honestly completes his 




                                                          
42
Bendel, E. Tax avoidance- is the party over? Without Prejudice, at p.21 
43
 Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance and section 103 of the Income Tax Act 1962 Act No. 58 of 1962. SARS, (2005) 
44
 Issued by the Commissioner for Inland Revenue on 1 April 1987 in connection with s105A of the Act 
10 
 
It would perhaps be more helpful to taxpayers and their advisors if a legislative GAAR can point 
out beforehand those elements that connotes that an arrangement is an avoidance arrangement.
45
  
2.1 Tax Avoidance 
 Tax avoidance is on the face of it legal and lawful. This can involve the use of legitimate means 
to structure ones tax affairs to obtain a tax benefit. This can be achieved by utilizing loopholes in 
tax laws and exploiting them within legal parameters
46
. Although tax avoidance may be against 
the purpose or true intention of the law, no legal measures can be taken to prevent it, unless the 
legislature amends the law to restrict the practice in question.
47
 
Courts hold the view that no legal understanding rests upon a taxpayer to pay higher taxes than 
he is legally bound to under the taxing Act and that a taxpayer is not prevented from entering 
into a genuine or bona fide, transaction which, when carried out, has the effect of avoiding or 
reducing liability to tax
48
. In Levene v IRC, Viscount Summer held that his Majesty‟s subjects 
are free to reduce their tax liability by structuring their tax arrangements so as to fall outside 
ambit of the taxing Act.
49
 
The view above was endorsed in Duke of Westminster, where Lord Tomlin held that: 
[e]very man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the 
appropriate Act is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to 
secure their result, then however inappropriate to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue or his 
fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax
50
. 
The Duke of Westminster principle has been the underlying principle in tax avoidance related 
cases. However with the passing of time, we have seen the courts slowly shifting from this 
approach and adopting a relatively harsher approach and currently many governments look upon 
                                                          
45
 See note 3 at p. 53. 
46
 Merowitz in 29.1; Huxham & Haupt at 350-351. On the meaning of tax avoidance see also Olivier, L Tax 
Avoidance Options Available to the Commissioner for Inland Revenue (1997) 4 South African Law Journal at 1-3. A 
Rapakko Base Company Taxation (1989) at 39 that it is the courts that are ultimately faced with difficult task of 
having to draw a line in certain practical cases between tax avoidance and evasion. 
47
 Oguttu, AW. Curbing Offshores Tax Avoidance: The Case of South African Companies and Trusts (2007). P.2. 
48
 Ibid p.2. 
49
 [1928] AC 21. 
50
 [1936] A.C. 1 HL. 
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In Hicklin v SIR
52
 and CIR v Sunnyside Centre (Pty) Ltd, it was observed that companies are 
often used in a number of ways to avoid taxes and when a scheme works no tears are shed for the 
Commissioner simply because a taxpayer can structure his tax affairs so as to reduce his tax 
liability and when he arranges his tax affairs so as to attract more than the minimum then he has 
to bear the repercussions.
53
 
Therefore given a set of facts, if a taxpayer‟s activities fall within the provisions of the tax 
statute, he is liable for tax; and if they do not, he is not liable
54
.  
In Smith v CIR
55
, it was held that the ordinary meaning of avoiding liability for a tax on income 
was „to get out of the way of, escape or prevent an anticipated liability‟.  
In Hicklin v SIR
56
, the Appellate Division recognized that such liability may vary from an 
impending certain expectation to some unclear distant possibility.  
Some judicial decisions have used the term „tax avoidance‟ in a derogatory sense.
57
For instance 
in CIR v Challenge Corp Ltd
58
, Lord Templeman outlined that tax avoidance connotes more than 
merely getting out of the way of an anticipated liability and noted further that: 
Income tax is avoided and a tax advantage is derived for an arrangement when the taxpayer 
reduces his liability to tax without involving him [sic] in the loss or expenditure which 
entitles him to that reduction. The taxpayer engaged in tax avoidance does not reduce his 
income or suffer a loss or incur expenditure but nevertheless obtains a deduction in his 
liability as if he had… In an arrangement of tax avoidance the financial position of the 
taxpayer is unaffected (save for the costs of delivering and implementing the arrangement)…  
                                                          
51
 See e.g. [We] are strongly determined to attack those who try and avoid tax. Our approach in this area is clear- 
to deter tax avoidance in any form: HMRC. Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes, Consultative document (2009) 4, 
http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk. 
52
 1980 (1) SA 481 (A) at 483F.  
53
 1997 (1) SA 68 (A) at 77F. 
54
 Stinglingh, M… et al. Silke on South African Income Tax (2014) at §19.1. 
55
 1964 (1) SA 324 (A); 26 SATC 1. 
56
 1980 (1) SA 481 (A); 41 SATC 179. 
57
 See note 41 above at §19.1. 
58
 [1987] AC 155. 
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Determined generally, avoidance includes all actions that may have the consequences of 
reducing, removing or postponing tax liability in a manner which does not collide with the law.
59
 
While the courts welcomes the view that a taxpayer can structure his/her tax affairs so as to 
achieve the minimum tax liability possible, if a taxpayer does so in a manner which defeats the 




2.2 Tax Planning 
The term tax planning or mitigation is when the taxpayer utilizes options presented to him by the 
statute and as such the taxpayer must genuinely suffer the economic consequences as intended by 
the legislature.
61
 Every day, taxpayers structure their transactions to make use of the deductions, 
exemptions and allowances contained in the tax statutes so as to minimize the tax liabilities 
imposed by the detailed, complicated and lengthy sets of taxing provisions
62
. 
Tax avoidance can be split into acceptable avoidance such as tax planning or mitigation and 
unacceptable avoidance behavior. The latter is punishable by law while the former is seen as a 
bonafide structuring of one‟s tax affairs within the ambit of the law. 
The concept of tax planning is therefore only interested in the structure of the taxpayer‟s 
transactions with the effect of reducing tax liability within the framework of the law without 
recourse to impermissible tax avoidance.
63
 
Sonnenbergs submits that courts and law makers have long found it difficult to discover abusive 
transactions so that taxpayers cannot benefit from the related tax savings
64
.  
                                                          
59
 Freedman, J. Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General Anti-Avoidance Principle (2004), Tax 
Review. 
60
 CIR v Delfos [1933] AD 242 at 253. 
61
 CIR v Willoughby [1995] STC 995. 
62
 See note 25 above. 
63
SARS Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance and section 103 of Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
64
 See note 38. 
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In the United States authority of Gregory v Helvering
65
, It was stated that the legal right of a 
taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be its taxes, or to altogether avoid 
them by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted. 
Similarly in the United Kingdom, in IRC v Duke of Westminster, the House of Lords affirmed 
that a taxpayer is entitled to structure his tax affairs by taking advantage of the various options 
offered by the legislation so as to achieve the minimum liability possible and no matter how 
unhappy the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or other taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he 
cannot be coerced to pay more.
66
 
In support of the view above, Watermayer CJ unequivocally asserted the taxpayer‟s freedom to 
structure his tax affairs so as to reduce his tax liability by emphasizing that: 
In a wide sense also the amount of a man‟s income tax can be reduced from what it was in 
previous years if he earns less income than in the previous years, but here again it is absurd 
to suppose that the legislature intended to impose a penalty upon a man who enters into a 
transaction which reduces the amount of his income from what it was in the previous years 
merely because his purpose was to reduce the amount of his income and consequently his 
tax. These two types of cases may be uncommon but there are many other ordinary and 
legitimate transactions and operations which, if a taxpayer carries them out, would have the 
effect of reducing the amount of his income to something less than it was in the past, or 
freeing himself from taxation of some part of his future income.
67
 
From the above it is clear that the taxpayer may structure his tax affairs to reduce his tax liability 
in a manner which does not conflict with the law. It should however be noted that, even when tax 
avoidance seems genuine and lawful, the conduct maybe regarded immoral or otherwise 
considered unacceptable behavior. 
2.3 Tax evasion 
Tax evasion is considered a criminal offence which attracts grievous penalties, including the 
possibility of and imprisonment. Tax evasion includes the use of fraud and trickery to minimize 
tax liability through the process of non-disclosure of income and sometimes exaggerated 
                                                          
65
 293 U.S 465 [1935]. 
66
 [1936] A.C. 1 HL. 
67





 Tax evasion has also been termed as „illegal arrangements through or by means of 
which liability to tax is hidden or ignored‟
69
 
Some examples of tax evasion include: 
 Falsification of returns, books and accounts; 
 Conclusion of sham transactions; 
 Deliberate non- disclosure of income or deliberate overstatement of deductible 
expenditure. 
The distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion is best illustrated in R v Mears, where 
Gleeson CJ states that: 
… the difference between the two is simple and clear. Tax avoidance involves using or 
attempting to use lawful means to escape reduce tax obligations. Tax evasion involves using 
unlawful means to escape payment of tax. Tax avoidance is lawful and tax evasion is unlawful.70 
Tax evasion is said to have occurred when the Commissioner is not informed of all relevant facts 
concerning an assessment and if found to be dishonesty may lead to criminal prosecution while 
innocent evasion may lead to reassessment.
71
 
Tax evasion just like tax avoidance affects many jurisdictions. In South Africa, the Income Tax 
Act
72
  imposes sanctions on taxpayers found guilty of evading tax and this may include 
imprisonment.  
2.4 Impermissible tax avoidance 
An avoidance arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement if its sole or main 
purpose was to obtain a tax benefit and in the context of business- it was entered into or carried 
out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed for bona fide business 
                                                          
68
 Hauxham, K & Haupt, P. Notes on South African Income Tax (2007). Cape Town, Hedron at 350. 
69
 OECD, International Tax Terms for the Participants in the OECD Programme of Co-operation with Non- OECD 
Economies. 
70
(1997) 37 ATR 321. 
71
 CIR v Challenge Corporation Ltd (1987) AC 155. 
72
 Act 58 of 1962. 
15 
 
purposes, other than a tax benefit; or it lacks commercial substance, in whole or in part.
73
 In a 
context other than business,(an arrangement entered into by a taxpayer must make economical 
sense), an impermissible avoidance arrangement must have been entered into or carried out by 
means or in a manner, which would not normally be employed for bona fide purposes, other than 
obtaining a tax benefit
74
. 
The SARS Discussion Paper on „impermissible tax avoidance‟ points out tax avoidance practices 
which are not legally acceptable.
75
 The report‟s main focus is the form of „tax avoidance‟ which 
is essentially a misuse or abuse of the law that is driven by the exploitation of structural 
loopholes in the law to achieve tax outcomes that were not intended by Parliament. Lord 
Templeman in CIR v Challenge Corporation stated that: 
Income tax is avoided and a tax advantage is derived from an arrangement when the taxpayer 
reduces his liability to tax without involving him in the loss or expenditure which entitles 
him to that reduction, The taxpayer engaged in tax avoidance does not reduce his income or 




Impermissible tax avoidance is seen as an arrangement which is far-fetched or artificial with 
remote or no actual economic effect on a taxpayer, which is usually formulated to manipulate tax 
statutes so as obtain an outcome which is in conflict with the true intention of the law makers.
77
 
Such an arrangement defeat the purpose of section 80A (c) of the Income Tax Act
78
 which 
requires that a legitimate arrangement must create rights and obligations that would not normally 
be created between persons dealing at arm‟s length (an arm‟s length transaction is when parties 
involved in a transaction act independently and have no relationship to each other), where an 
arrangement in question does not conform with this provision, it may give rise direct or 
otherwise in the misuse and abuse of the provisions
79
. This condition or test has proved to be a 
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very powerful tool for the Commissioner to cramp down on unacceptable avoidance behavior 
also known as impermissible tax avoidance.  
Mitchell observed that in drafting section 80A; it would seem that the legal draftsman hoped for 
a provision that could certainly be used by the Commissioner to prevent tax-saving arrangements 
from being successful
80
. This provision has proved to be a very powerful tool in the hands of the 
Commissioner, to deal with the tax avoidance schemes
81
.  
Interim responses suggests that most commentators have accepted the basic categories of tax 
evasion, impermissible tax avoidance and legitimate tax planning as highlighted in the SARS 
Discussion Paper.
82
 While others, have, however taken issue with them
83
. They have argued 
instead for a simple distinction between “unlawful” tax evasion and “lawful” tax avoidance with 
nothing, seemingly in between
84
. To be more specific, one observer called the whole notion of 
“impermissible tax avoidance” and its consequences as, in essence, nothing more than “risible” 




Similarly other commentators have hit hard on SARS for allegedly accusing the hard working 




Even in the United Kingdom, where the “choice doctrine” originated
87
, the House of Lords have 
made it clear that Lord Tomlin‟s dictum in the Duke of Westminster decision
88
 is no longer the 
last word on the subject, and that, in fact, it “tells us little or nothing as to what methods of 
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ordering one‟s affairs will be recognized as effective to lessen the tax that would otherwise 
attach to them if business transactions where conducted in a more straight forward way"
89
. 
The rule of law requires that a good law must be clear, certain and predictable, a notion which 
most legal philosophers subscribe to. It has been established that a law must be relatively certain 
in order to conform to the principles of the rule of law.
90
 This concept has proved to be difficult 
and complicated; Hayek outlines the essence of the rule of law as follows: 
[G]overnment in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules 
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive 




The two major elements underlying the rule of law is first and foremost the emphasis which is 
placed on rules which have been fixed and that these rules must be announced in advance so that 
subjects must be governed by known rules and not by whim of discretion.
92
  Secondly, the 




It is further acknowledged that the rule of law requires that subjects must be governed by law 
and not by administrative measures.
94
 It is therefore in line with these requirements that all legal 
rules must generally meet a certain standard including inter alia, that they be prospective and not 
retrospective, possible to comply with, published and fairly stable through time.
95
 For a GAAR to 
meet these criterions, it would require a clear and coherent mechanism under which mitigation 
could be consistently distinguished from avoidance.
96
 Certainly a broad based administrative 
discretion does not meet the requirement of certainty and thus does not conform to the rule of 
law.
97
 Taxpayers should not have to rely on the administrative discretion of revenue officials as 
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It is generally an acceptable concept that a taxpayer has a legal right to arrange or structure his 
tax affairs to achieve the minimum tax liability possible. This study has so far established that 
tax avoidance is at face value legal. Tax avoidance is further divided into acceptable avoidance 
also known as tax planning or mitigation and unacceptable avoidance behavior which is 
sometimes referred to as „impermissible tax avoidance‟.  
Unacceptable avoidance behavior generally alludes to a practice that lessens, eradicates or defers 
a tax liability employing specific provisions of the tax statute in a way not intended by the 
legislature. 
To combat unacceptable avoidance behavior most jurisdictions including South Africa have 
adopted a statutory mechanism known as the GAAR. It has also been established that tax statutes 
do not provide a clear distinction between tax avoidance which is acceptable and tax avoidance 
which is unacceptable leading to uncertainty among taxpayers and tax advisors alike.  
On the other hand, tax evasion is illegal as it involves deceit and fraud and is punishable by law 
which may sometimes include imprisonment. 
It is trite that legal rules which are clear, predictable and certain increase compliance as 
taxpayers will be fully aware of the consequences before making a decision of entering into an 
arrangement or transaction.  
Notwithstanding that the judiciary have not come up with a conclusive concept to distinguish 
acceptable from unacceptable avoidance behavior, they have gone a step further to fill in the 
lacuna left by our tax statutes by formulating doctrines to help arrive at their decisions involving 
tax avoidance. 
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3 South African General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAAR’s) 
An aptly drafted GAAR is one which would include clear and unwavering standards known to 
taxpayers in advance, but would not eliminate the need for administrative discretion.
99
A GAAR 
should provide taxpayers, the revenue authority and the courts with a comprehensible and 
systematic framework able to be applied consistently to ascertain whether an arrangement is of a 
type caught by the GAAR.
100
 
The attributes deep rooted in all GAARs are that a GAAR will be applied where a taxpayer 
undertakes an arrangement that results in a tax benefit, where the taxpayer or arrangement is 
conceived to have a dominant purpose.
101
 In the sub-sections to follow, the writer will discuss 
the South African statutory GAAR and the relevant case law so as to ascertain how the courts 
have dealt with the issue of tax avoidance.  
3.1 Brief background to the South African GAAR 
The concept of GAAR in South Africa dates back as far as 1941, making it one of the first 
countries to introduce this statutory mechanism which was incorporated under section 90.
102
 The 
main object of this was to combat the increasing number of tax avoidance cases at the time. With 
the passage of time, section 90 proved to be ineffective and it was repealed and replaced with 
section 103
103
. However with the lapse of time again, the hope which was bestowed on section 
103 diminished as it was perceived to be too weak to counter sophisticated schemes formulated 
by taxpayers. Accordingly SARS and its stakeholders resolved section 103 was too ineffective to 
withstand tax avoidance. 
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However such a conclusion by SARS and its stakeholders was seen as a tactic to vilify the 
responsibilities of the court to safeguard taxpayers and the fiscus and therefore the court could 
not be held accountable for the insufficiency of the GAAR
104
. 
Section 103 was however repealed and replaced with the new GAAR contained in sections 80A 
to 80L
105
. The new GAAR applies to any arrangement entered into on or after the 2
nd
 of 
November 2006. The GAAR in its current form was enacted so as to stop taxpayers from deriving 
a tax benefit from what would otherwise be an impermissible avoidance arrangement. 
The key provision in the current GAAR is section 80A of the Income Tax Act.
106
 This provision 
provides us with the definition of the term “impermissible avoidance arrangement”. It is however 
important to note that the subsequent provisions of the GAAR merely ride on and expand section 
80A of the Act. The provisions also provide the Commissioner with procedural and 
administrative guidance. 
Section 80A of the Act provides as follows: 
“An avoidance arrange is an impermissible avoidance arrangement if its sole or main purpose 
was to obtain a tax benefit and- 
(a) In the context of business- 
(i) It was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not 
normally be employed for bonafide business purposes, other than obtaining a tax 
benefit; or 
(ii) It lacks commercial substance, in whole or in part, taking into account the 
provisions of section 80C; 
(b) In a context other than business, it was entered into or carried out by means or in a 
manner which would not normally be employed for a bonafide purpose, other than 
obtaining a tax benefit; or 
(c) In any context- 
                                                          
104
 Taxpayer, vol. 54 (4) April 2005 at p. 61-62. 
105
 Part IIA of ITA (1962). 
106
 No. 58 of 1962. 
21 
 
(i) It has created rights or obligations that would not normally be created between 
persons dealing at arm’s length ; or 
(ii) It would result directly or indirectly in the misuse or abuse of the provisions of 
this Act. 
Despite the existence of differences in the predated and the current GAAR, certain terms such as 
purpose and abnormality are present in both, these tests are cardinal in that, for a transaction, 
operation or scheme to be attacked by the GAAR, both the purpose and the abnormality 
requirement must be satisfied.  
The writer will discuss the current South African statutory GAAR and where necessary the 
repealed section 103 and examine the requirements which have to be met for an arrangement, 
transaction or scheme to be adjudged an „impermissible avoidance arrangement‟.  
3.2 Statutory GAAR 
The GAAR currently in force replaced section 103 and is incorporated in section 80A to L under 
Part IIA of the Income Tax Act.
107
 
For a GAAR to be applied on an arrangement which is considered an impermissible avoidance 
arrangement, essential elements which must be met are that, there must be a transaction, 
operation, or scheme.  In the present GAAR, it is required that an „arrangement‟ i.e. agreement or 
understanding, whether enforceable or not, including all steps in it or part of it and that the sole 
or main purpose is to gain a tax benefit. 
In conformity with section 80A of the Income Tax Act
108
, an arrangement is an ‘impermissible 
avoidance arrangement’ if its sole or main purpose was to obtain a tax benefit and- 
 It is entered into in a manner which would not normally be employed for bona 
fide business purposes other than obtaining a tax benefit; 
 It lacks commercial substance, in whole or in part; 
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 It has created rights or obligations that would not normally be created between 
persons dealing at arm’s length; or 
 It would result directly or indirectly in the misuse or abuse of the provisions. 
3.2.1 Impermissible avoidance arrangement 
An arrangement is deemed an impermissible avoidance arrangement firstly if its sole or main 
purpose was to obtain or derive a tax benefit.
109
 
 The second aspect is that, for avoidance behavior to be considered unacceptable there has to be 
an „arrangement‟ present.  
An arrangement is spelled out as „any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
understanding (whether enforceable or not), including all steps therein or parts thereof, and 
includes any of the foregoing involving the alienation of property‟.
110
  
The arrangement denotation also includes the words „enforceable or not‟, which simply signify 
that whether a „transaction, operation or scheme‟ is not legally enforceable, the GAAR will still 
employed. 
In examining the terms „transaction, operation or scheme, it was said that the word „scheme‟ is a 




 The above interpretation was validated by the court in the case of CIR v Louw
112
, where it was 
held that, the term scheme is wide enough to cover circumstances in which later steps in a course 
of action were left undetermined from inception. 
The term „all steps therein or parts thereof‟ are included in the definition of an „arrangement‟ 
meaning that all parts or to some degree part of an arrangement may amount to an „arrangement‟. 
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The Income Tax Act
113
 does not provide a definition of „all steps or parts‟, however Clegg and 
Stretch
114
 suggests that each relates to a recognizable transactional element of the whole. 




In light of the above it is of great importance to note that the Commissioner has to formally 
inform the taxpayer exactly which parts of the arrangement he is attacking, this has been seen as 
advantageous to a taxpayer.
116
 
This brings us to another important element to be examined in the following sub-section which 
requires that an „arrangement in question must have an effect of procuring a tax benefit. 
3.2.2 The sole or main purpose was to obtain a tax benefit 
In terms of the GAAR, tax avoidance is only contemplated unacceptable if the sole or main 
purpose of entering into an arrangement was to obtain a tax benefit.
117
 The words to be 
scrutinized are „solely‟ and „mainly‟ as they are not defined by the Act.  
In SBI v Lourens Erasmus (Edms) Bpk, it was held that „solely‟ refers to the only purpose of the 
taxpayer, whereas „mainly‟ will refer to a quantitative measure of more than 50%. 
118
 
To elaborate on the term „solely‟, it must be clear that the only reason that the taxpayer entered 
into an „arrangement‟ in question was to derive a tax benefit. Similarly where the „sole‟ purpose 
was not to obtain a tax benefit, it must at least be proved that the purpose was „mainly‟ to obtain 
a tax benefit which translates to a calculable measure of slightly more than 50%.  
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3.2.3 Tax Benefit 
For an „arrangement‟ to be considered an „avoidance arrangement‟, there must be a tax benefit 
involved and it must also be evident that the taxpayer‟s sole or main purpose of entering such an 
arrangement must be to obtain a tax benefit.
119
 
The definition of tax benefit is provided for in section 1 of the Act and describes it as follows: 
It includes any avoidance, postponement or reduction of any liability for tax.
120
 
To determine whether a tax benefit has been secured by a taxpayer, the court in ITC 1625,held 
that a feasible test to determine the existence of a tax benefit was whether the taxpayer would 
have suffered tax but for the transaction. The Commissioner would then need to determine or 
predict another transaction or scheme that the taxpayer would have entered into.
121
 
In in as much as there is no clear test provided by the legislation to determine what amounts to 
tax benefit, the courts have adopted the „but for‟ test as evidenced in the decision above. 
3.2.4 Tainted elements 
The abnormality element is the last requirement which must be satisfied in order to determine an 
avoidance arrangement as an impermissible avoidance arrangement. An arrangement in question 
must contain an abnormality element; this is a trace of something bad, offensive or harmful 
which SARS called tainted elements.
122
 










                                                          
119
 Section 80 A of Act 58 of 1962. 
120
 Act 58 of 1962. 
121
 1996 59 SATC 383. 
122
 SARS. Draft Comprehensive Guide to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
123
 Section 80A (a) of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 
124
 Section 80A (b) 
125
Section 80A (c). 
25 
 
3.2.4.1 in the Context of Business 
An abnormality element in the context of business is apportioned into two further criterions 
namely, the business purpose test and the lack of commercial substance test which the writer will 
expand on below.  
(i) Business purpose test 
This test provides that a taxpayer entering into an arrangement must in a business context, not 
engage in any means which would not normally be employed for legitimate or bona fide business 
purposes other than securing a tax benefit. 
The Act does not furnish us with the definition of the term „bonafide business purpose‟. However 
Clegg
126
 recommends that the term means that the transaction must be non-fictitious and not 




The term bonafide business purpose has been a subject of contention among scholars with some 
alleging it only creates lack of certainty.  Silke in exploring the term bonafide noted that the term 
relates to the business purpose so that, even if the arrangement is entered into or carried out in a 




It is thus not conclusive in the sense that an arrangement may be entered into or carried out in a 
bonafide manner and still found to be abnormal in a business context.  
(ii) The lack of commercial substance test 
The commercial substance test which is an extension of the business purpose test is split into a 
general test and a list of indicators that indicates a lack of commercial substance. 
The Act in light of the general test establishes the definition of the lack of commercial substance 
on which the Commissioner places reliance to determine whether an „arrangement‟ in dispute 
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 In line with the definition of an „arrangement‟ such an 
„arrangement‟ must give rise to a tax benefit as well as a notable effect on the business risks or 
net cash flows. 
One of the issues which the current GAAR addresses is the disguised schemes created by 
taxpayers so as to maximize their tax benefit. It is of great importance to note that a mere tax 




 commercial substance will be lacking where there is: 
(i) A disproportionate relationship between the actual economic expenditure or loss 
incurred by a part and the value of the tax benefit that would have been obtained 
by that party but for the provisions of the GAAR; or 
(ii) A loss claimed for tax a purpose that significantly exceeds any measurable 
reduction in that party’s net worth. 
(iii)Commercial substance indicators 
To appreciate that an „arrangement‟ lacks commercial substance with regard to section 80C (1) 
of the Act, the Commissioner will place reliance on section 80C (2) of the Act which lists the 
indicators to determine whether an „arrangement‟ in question lacks commercial substance.
131
 In 
terms of the Act, the indicators include but are not limited to the following:
132
 
 The legal substance or effect differs from the legal form of the steps (substance v form); 
 The inclusion or presence of round trip financing; 
 Accommodating or tax indifferent parties; 
 Elements that offset or cancel each other. 
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No guideline or indicator tabulated in section 80C (2) of the Act is predominant than the other 
and once the Commissioner verifies that one of the indicators is present he may subject to section 
80C (1) hold such an „arrangement‟ to be an impermissible avoidance arrangement. 
3.2.4.2 in a non business context 
The Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 provides in section 80A (b)  that an avoidance arrangement 
is an impermissible avoidance arrangement if in a context other than business, it was entered into 
or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed for a bonafide 
purpose, other than obtaining a tax benefit 
The aforementioned provision highlights that where an arrangement in a non business context 
has a bonafide purpose other than obtaining a tax benefit, the Commissioner can still invoke the 
GAAR to attack the „arrangement‟. 
Clegg recommends that the test to be used in the non business context would be an objective test 
in that it has to be determined if the arrangement under examination was entered into or carried 
out by a means or in a manner which would not normally be employed for a bonafide purpose.
133
 
The Commissioner may therefore at his preference attack a legitimate business arrangement 
using section 80A (b) of the Act instead of section 80A (a). 
3.2.4.3 in any other context 
The third requirement of the tainted elements is in any other context is also known as the non-
length rights and obligations element. This element was also present in the previous GAAR. 
An avoidance arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement if
134
: 
(i) It has created rights or obligations that would not normally be created between persons 
dealing at arm’s length.
135
 
(ii) It would result directly or indirectly in the misuse or abuse of the provisions of this Act 
(including the provisions of this Part).
136
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In terms of its application section 80A (c) is wide in nature as it applies to any context. Cilliers 




The Act does not define the term „arm‟s length transaction‟ and in view of this reference to case 
law shall be made. 
In CIR v Hicklin
138
, the court held that the term „arm‟s length transaction‟ indicates a deal 
between two parties who are independent of each other in a willing buyer and seller 
environment. 
The „arms length‟ test in so far as rights and obligations is concerned can be elucidated as 
meaning what unrelated persons to the transaction would have done in a given a situation. Hence 
such parties to a transaction who are independent of each other will be perceived to have acted at 
„arms length‟ in line with the principle of demand and supply. 
The second provision under examination is section 80A (c) (ii) , the purpose of this section is to 
ascertain whether an „arrangement‟ in question leads to a misuse or abuse of the provisions of the 
Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962.  
The „misuse or abuse‟ provision is new to the South African GAAR and the rationale behind this 
insertion was to strengthen the modern approach to the translation of tax statutes “in order to find 




There are no guidelines on the concept of misuse or abuse in the Act nor has it been judicially 
contemplated. It is in view of this that Garg submits that it has to be seen in the context of 
existing South African legal principles and guidance found in foreign jurisdictions.
140
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The „misuse or abuse‟ provision‟s origin can be traced back to the Canadian Federal Income Tax 
Act under section 245(4)
141
 which provides that: 
For greater certainty, subsection 245(2) does not apply to a transaction where it may 
reasonably be considered that the transaction would not result directly or indirectly in a 
misuse of the provision of this Act or an abuse having regard to the provisions of this Act. 
The main reason of this provision is to limit the GAAR found in the Canadian section 245(2) 
which gives power to the Commissioner to countermand univocal provisions which creates 
unpredictability and causes prohibitory judicial interpretation.
142
  In view of this the Canadian 
GAAR may therefore not be applied where a transaction does not result in the misuse or abuse of 
the provision of the Act.
143
 
Seen as most of the provisions contained in the GAAR lack clarity, certainty and predictability, 
the writer will in the following sub-section examine case law to determine how the courts have 
applied their minds in reaching at the decisions in tax avoidance related cases. 
 
3.3 Judicial Approach 
This section will conceptualize how the courts in South Africa have addressed or applied the 
provisions of the now repealed section 103 and the GAAR currently in force by examining 
selected case law. This section will also attempt to examine how the courts decisions have 
influenced taxpayers and their tax advisors. 
Bearing in mind that for an „arrangement‟ to be declared impermissible, there must be an 
existence of a transaction, operation or scheme, it should further be recognized that South Africa 
is a common law state and the courts in order to battle tax avoidance schemes which are 
contemplated intolerable, have embraced a common law ideology that the courts will not be 
deceived by sham transactions, substance and not the form of a transaction prevails. In Kilburn v 
Estate Kilburn, it was expressed in the most enduring terms that a court will not be misled by the 
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form of a transaction as it set aside the veil in which the transaction is enveloped and examine its 
true nature and substance.
144
 
3.4 Case Law 
South Africa has over a period of time developed a wealthy tradition of case law to deal with 
unacceptable tax avoidance. Some of the cases which the writer will examine relate to the GAAR 
which has since been repealed. Below are a few examples to illustrate how the courts have 
applied their minds in arriving at certain decisions concerning tax avoidance. 
3.4.1 CIR v Bobat, Moosa and Moolla
145
 
In the unreported case of Bobat, Moosa & Moolla a trust was formed by the taxpayers‟ father 
Mr. E.M. Moosa who was a director in various family companies. The first and third taxpayers 
are sisters with taxpayer number two. Two family companies namely Trueart Furniture Sales 
(Pty) Ltd. And KIM Investments (Pty) Ltd. were under the control of the trust. In 1990 a 
complex scheme was hatched and the two companies under the control of the trust were 
afterwards deregistered and certain payments made to the beneficiaries. Taxpayer one and three 
did not declare this income in their returns and taxpayer number two said his receipt was of a 
capital nature and hence the three taxpayers were not taxed. The taxpayers in this case were 
acting under the advice of the accountant who actually attested to that effect as a witness that the 
main purpose of the scheme was to circumvent estate duty at the instance of the beneficiaries 
upon their deaths. 
In view of the above, the Commissioner invoked section 103(1) and applied it to the alleged 
scheme. On appeal, it was contended by the appellants that section 103(1) did not apply to the 
alleged scheme. 
For section 103 (1)
146
 to be invoked, the following four elements listed below must be present: 
(a) A transaction, operation or scheme; 
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(b) With the consequence of gaining a tax benefit; 
(c) Whose sole or main purpose is to obtain a tax benefit; and 
(d) The transaction in question must have been entered into in a manner which is not normal. 
(a) In arriving at its decision, the court had to first establish whether a transaction, 
operation or scheme was carried out.  
Placing reliance on Meyerowitz v CIR
147
 a case which dealt with whether various transaction in 
terms of section 90
148
 amounted to “schemes”, Bayer J stated that: 
… Even if it were otherwise, I think that there is sufficient unity about the whole matter to 
justify its being called an arrangement for this purpose, because the ultimate object is to 
secure for somebody money free from what would otherwise be the burden or the full burden 
of surtax. Merely because the final step to secure this objective is left unresolved at the 
outset, and decided on later, does not seem to me to rob the scheme of the necessary unity to 
justify its being called an “arrangement. 
In view of Bobat, Moosa, Moolla, the taxpayers appointed their wives as beneficiaries of the 
trust which was formed by the taxpayer‟s father. Secondly two of the various companies owned 
by the family were under the control of the trust and lastly, the two companies are deregistered 
and certain payments are made to their beneficiaries. The planning and amount of work which 
went into this can only be construed as an „arrangement‟ or „scheme‟ as there was a motive for 
all this planning and work. The writer is therefore satisfied that that the first element of 
„arrangement‟ or „scheme‟ has been met. 
(b) The second question to be established is whether such transaction, operation or 
scheme had the repercussion of obtaining a tax benefit.  
The meaning of „avoiding tax‟ was explored in CIR v King, were Watermeyer CJ stated that: 
the legislature intended the words “avoiding tax” to cover the case whereby a man orders his 
affairs that he escapes from liability from taxation which he ought to pay upon the income 
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However a contradictory view was expressed in the case of Smith v CIR
150
, where Steyn J held 
that- the ordinary meaning of avoiding liability for tax on income should be applied meaning 
“to get out of the way of, escape or prevent anticipated liability”. 
Applying Steyn J‟s translation of avoiding liability in the Smith’s case, it can be explained that 
taxpayers Bobat, Moosa and Moolla conceived a scheme whose sole or main purpose was to get 
out of the way of, escape or prevent anticipated liability. 
This conforms to the second element which stipulates that the transaction, operation or scheme 
must be carried out to derive a tax benefit.  
(c) The third element to be appraised is that the sole or main purpose of entering into 
the transaction, operation or scheme was to obtain a tax benefit.  
In establishing  the sole or main purpose of entering into the transaction, operation or scheme, 
the onus rests on the taxpayer to adduce evidence as to why the „arrangement‟ or „scheme‟ was 
carried out. This premise is backed by Kroon J in Income Tax Case 1636 where it was expressed 
that: 
The test to be applied is a subjective one, i.e. what was the subjective intention of the 
taxpayer in entering into or carrying out the transaction? Because a subjective approach is to 
be applied in the determination of the purpose of the transaction, the evidence of the 
taxpayer, the progenitor of the transaction, as to why it was entered into or carried out, is of 
prime importance. The ipse dixit of the taxpayer is, however, not decisive and it must be 
measured against the credibility of the witness who give the evidence, the other evidence 
adduced and the probabilities‟
151
. 
The Act does not define nor does it give us guidance on what the term main purpose mean. To 
determine or ascertain what the term main purpose mean the writer shall make reference to case 
law.   
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In the case of SBI v Lourens Erasmus (Edms) Bpk
152
, it was held that „main purpose‟ means the 
most unquestionable, authentic or dominant purpose. This test is subjective meaning that a 
taxpayer may be influenced by personal taste or opinion therefore a taxpayer may enter into an 
„arrangement‟ for two different reasons, for instance one may be induced by a tax consideration 
while the other may have a different purpose. 
Quantitatively the term „sole‟ would mean 100% in other words it has to be the only reason for 
engaging in a particular „arrangement‟ while „mainly‟ simply has to be above 50% meaning that 
of the two or more reasons advanced, one has to have a dominant effect. 
In the case under consideration, the evidence presented by the accountant showed that the 
transaction, operation or scheme had been entered into to avoid liability for estate duty payable 
by the estate upon the demise of the beneficiaries. Secondly, it was necessitated by the need to 
clean up the group especially because of the impediment emanating from crossholdings between 
the companies. 




It was further observed that, if there are two or more purposes and one is chosen over the other, it 
cannot be said that the main purpose was to avoid tax.
154
  
To this effect the taxpayers discharged the onus of proving that the sole or main purpose was not 
carried out for the benefit of obtaining a tax benefit hence the third element was not satisfied and 
consequently appeal was upheld.  
3.4.2 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd
155
 
The issue in contention in Conhage was the abnormality of the transaction in which SARS 
challenged the substance over form in light of the rental deductions through a sale and lease back 
agreement. 
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In this case the respondent concluded an agreement with regard to its manufacturing plant and 
equipment through a sale and leaseback agreement with Firstcorp Merchant Bank Ltd 
„Firstcorp‟. The respondent included in its returns, rental expenditure for deduction in the 
production of income under section 11 (a) of the Income Tax Act.
156
  However SARS disallowed 
the deductions alleging that, the agreements were not what they appeared to be and went on and 
went on to invoked section 103 of the Act.  
The taxpayer was discontented with the Commissioner‟s decision appealed to the Special Court 
and appeal was granted. 
The issue in this appeal was to determine the legitimate nature of the sale and leaseback 
agreements and ascertain whether commissioner correctly applied section 103 of the Act. 
(a) The first point of the study is therefore to explore and determine whether an 
undertaking is a transaction, operation or scheme. 
The taxpayer (Tycon) needed a capital injection so that it could diversify its operations and 
Firstcorp was willing provide such a loan. The parties settled for a sale and leaseback agreement 
fully aware of the tax benefits to be gained from this undertaking. Prior to the conclusion of these 
agreements, the parties‟ orchestrated substantial deliberations with their experts, this gave rise to 
the agreements under examination. 
Following the lengthy process the parties underwent, the sale and leaseback agreements was 
finalized by the taxpayer (Tycon) and the financier Firstcorp Merchant Bank. In accordance with 
section 103, the undertaking constituted a transaction, operation or scheme. 
(b) The second element to be satisfied is whether such a transaction, operation or 
scheme gave rise to a tax benefit. 
As seen above, the Commissioner alleged that the parties designed the agreement in such a 
manner so as to obtain a tax benefit as envisaged by section 103. However the taxpayer noted 
that the financing could either be arranged as a loan or a sale and leaseback and the taxpayer 
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choose the latter fully acknowledging that although the transaction was entered into so as to 
reduce its tax liability, it argued that it was not the main purpose of the transaction. 
The second element of a transaction, operation or scheme giving rise to a tax benefit has also 
been satisfied. 
(c) The third element to be determined is that the taxpayer entered into a transaction, 
operation or scheme for the sole or main purpose of gaining a tax benefit. 
The general rule is that once it has been determined that a taxpayer entered into a transaction, 
operation or scheme for the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit,  the burden of proving that such a 
transaction, operation or scheme was not entered into for the sole or main purpose of obtaining a 
tax benefit is on the Taxpayer.  
The taxpayer (Tycon) in giving evidence contended that the main purpose of entering into a sale 
and leaseback agreement was to procure capital and not to obtain a tax benefit. It further 
contended that if the tax benefit derived from the agreements can be considered as a purpose of 
the transaction, then it was not the main purpose of the transaction. 
In arriving at the decision, the Judge held that the taxpayer could not have carried out an 
undertaking if it did not require capital, thus the third element was not satisfied.   
(d) Upon determining that the dominant purpose was to obtain a tax benefit or 
otherwise, the last inquiry as anticipated by section 103
157
 is to establish if the 
transaction was entered into in a manner which is abnormal. 
Section 103
158
 warrants the Commissioner to establish the taxpayer‟s liability for tax by 
dismissing any abnormal transaction which a taxpayer may have carried out to gain a tax benefit. 
It is notable that the consequence of such transactions is fundamentally a question of fact. Unlike 
the third element where we noted that onus lies with the taxpayer to prove that the tax benefit 
was not the dominant purpose of entering into a transaction in question, the onus of proving the 
existence of an abnormal element in a transaction rests on the Commissioner. 
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In Conhage, the Commissioner contended that while the taxpayer did not act dishonestly by 
concealing the transactions, the undertaking fell short of the necessary elements of a sale. It was 
further contended that the parties had no true intention of entering into the agreements of sale 
and leaseback as they masked the real nature of the transactions. 
In passing judgment, the court established that the onus of proving the originality of the 
agreements was on the taxpayer which it rightly discharged. It was also held that the 
Commissioner had failed to prove the abnormality of the sale and leaseback agreements and that 
the taxpayer proved the lack of the purpose requirement. 
Relying on the authority of SIR v Geusteyn, Forsyth and Joubert
159
, the Judge outlined three 
points to contemplate when establishing what amounts to „normality‟ or „abnormality‟ of the 
transaction. 
The first one was that, given that the Commissioner may invoke section 103(1) upon the 
satisfaction of all the requirements, the court may on appeal reconsider the whole case. 
Secondly, when deciding on the consequence, motive and normality of a transaction these are 
questions of fact and the onus rests with the Commissioner. 
And the last point to be determined is the real purpose of the taxpayer. 
On conclusion, Hefer J stated that, the agreements of sale and leaseback had a dual purpose of 
securing the taxpayer (Tycon) with capital and the benefit of tax advantage. It was further noted 
that even if the transaction was purely for a tax benefit, the taxpayer would not have entered into 
the transaction if it did not require a loan; therefore, the main purpose was because it needed 
capital. 
3.4.3 Commissioner for South African Revenue Authority Service v NWK Ltd.
160
 
The court in establishing that a transaction , operation or scheme is an „impermissible avoidance 
arrangement‟ has due to the lacuna not addressed by the GAAR moved a step further and adopted 
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common law doctrines to assist in determining the true substance and commercial purpose 
surrounding a transaction in question.  
The doctrine of substance over form was applied in C: SARS v NWK.
161
 The brief facts of this 
case are that the financial institution approached the respondent with an offer amounting to six 
agreements. The respondent borrowed R96 million instead of the R50 million which it initially 
wanted. The respondent secured this deal by entering into a contract on the set terms. In 
accordance with the six agreements, the financier was in a position to apply for a set off so that 
the commitment to repay the loan borrowed by the respondent (taxpayer) would be expunged 
when time for repayments came. 
The loan was structured in such a way that, the respondent was to make repayments in the form 
of delivering maize to the financial institution. This formal proposal was confidential and 
property of the financial institution to which the respondent (taxpayer) was to sign a 
confidentiality undertaking to protect the financial institution‟s trade secrets and highly 
confidential and sensitive information. This proposal which was subsequently approved also 
indicated that the respondent (taxpayer) would be able to deduct the interest incurred on the 
capital sum in the year of assessment under section 11(a). 
After allowing the deductions; the Commissioner reversed his decision and imposed additional 
tax of about 200 per cent plus interest. The taxpayer objected to this assessment but it was 
disallowed.  
The taxpayer took the matter on appeal to the Tax Court. On appeal, the Tax Court found in 
favour of the taxpayer alleging that, the parties only intended to give effect to the terms of the 
contract. 
The court further held that, section 103 could not be applied on the basis that it cannot be used as 
an alternative to declare a transaction simulated. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal the Commissioner placing reliance on section 103 
alleged that, the series of transactions gave rise to a transaction, operation or scheme. 





Three essential elements to be met as contemplated by section 103(1)
162
, were met. The dispute 
was whether this transaction, operation or scheme, was entered into in a manner which is 
abnormal.   
The court stated that, the mere fact that the taxpayer produced the agreements does not mean that 
the taxpayer discharged the onus that loan was not manufactured. 
In examining the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) 
Ltd. v CIR
163
, Hefer JA stated that: 
… This is plainly not so. That the parties did not indeed deliberately cast their arrangement 
in the form mentioned, must of course be accepted, that, after all, is what they had been 
advised to do. The real question is; however, whether they actually intended that each 
agreement would between the parties have effect according to its tenor. If not, effect must be 
given to what the transaction really is. 
The Judge also reflected on the perspective of Harms JA as highlighted in the case of Relier 
(Pty) Ltd. v CIR
164
, where it was noted that if agreements under consideration were taken at the 
apparent worth then the court have to rule in favour of the taxpayer, however if it is found that 
the agreement in question had „unfamiliar‟ and „fictitious‟ characteristics to it then questions of 
the real intention of the taxpayer have to be raised. 
The court in this case had to remove the wrapping from the transaction to examine the substance 
and the true nature of the transaction. Lewis JA came to the conclusion and held that: 
… There is something with dressing up or disguising a transaction to make it appear to be 
something that it is not, especially if that has the purpose of tax evasion or the avoidance of a 
peremptory rule of law.
165
 
It was thus held that the transaction was manufactured in that the transactions inter partes had no 
commercial substance and hence did not make business sense. 
The NWK decision is a departure from the Conhage case in that the court has embraced the 
doctrine of substance over form. It was attested by the Supreme Court of Appeal that there is 
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nothing erroneous in principle to enter into arrangements which are tax effective; it is however 
wrong to conceal a transaction to make it appear something it is not.
166
 Therefore the commercial 
sense aspect must be reviewed in establishing the true substance and purpose of a transaction. 
The NWK judgment received mixed reaction. Some practitioners and scholars
167
 believed that, 








Broomberg also asserted that, if this is correct, then the court did not respect the rule of law 
because no tax should be payable if a transaction gives rise to genuine rights and obligations that, 
even after the application of the statutory GAAR do not attract tax under the Income Tax Act
170
. 
3.5 The effect hereof on Tax Payers and Tax Advisors 
Having examined the predated GAAR in section 103, Part IIA of the GAAR which is currently in 
force and some selected case law, it has been established that there has been a notable 
development in the study and theory of law in the area of tax avoidance. 
It has been observed that when section 103 was in force, Judges used a literal approach of 
interpreting provisions of the tax statutes an attitude which was seen to favour taxpayers (as 
noticed in Conhage) than the fiscus. However with the enactment of Part IIA, Judges have 
developed a tougher attitude known as a purposive approach of interpreting tax statutes. This 
approach favors the fiscus contrary to the literal approach which favored taxpayers as witnessed 
in cases before the NWK Ltd.   
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The inquiry has also shown that both the GAAR and case law has not provided us with a clear 
test to indicate what constitutes acceptable or unacceptable tax avoidance. The lack of clarity, 
certainty and predictability in as far as acceptable and unacceptable avoidance behavior is 
concerned has posed serious challenges for taxpayers and their advisors. 
With the ever increasing complex and sophisticated schemes formulated by taxpayers and their 
advisors, it has become increasingly difficulty for law makers to foretell schemes which would 
amount to unacceptable tax behavior.  It is therefore imperative that more research on tax 
avoidance and the GAAR is required so as to come up with a conclusive GAAR which will help 
pre-empt tax avoidance. 
While it is generally acceptable that a taxpayer should be „entitled to use his craftiness and 
expertise without limit in order to secure a lower tax charge‟, and that it is the responsibility of 
the law makers to „introduce specific rules to block such attempts‟ this is seen to lead to a „sort 
of fiscal chess game, but with an ever increasing number of moves and pieces‟.
171
 
The uncertainty surrounding tax avoidance and the GAAR can partly be attributed to a poor 
design of a GAAR which has negative effect in that it has a conceptual advantage of drawing a 
line in the sand to guide taxpayers between what is acceptable or impermissible tax behavior.
172
  
However it must be noted that according to the contra fiscum rule, were the GAAR is found to be 
enigmatic both in design or administration leading to uncertainty for taxpayers, then such 
ambiguity should be ruled in favour of a taxpayer.
173
 
Considering that the burden of proof is mostly on the taxpayer to defend against a GAAR attack, 
the inference to be drawn on having a GAAR may be seen as commanding a significant and 
arguably oppressive compliance burden on taxpayers.
174
 
It is however common place that, the application of the GAAR is often a relevant factor in the 
administration of other provisions of a tax code affecting advisors.
175
 For instance under Part 










 Ibid, p.8. 
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IVA of the Australian Income Assessment Tax Act No.27 of 1936 is a relevant factor in the 
application of the Promoter Penalties rules which make tax avoidance an offence.
176
 
The deep-rooted judicial approach which allowed taxpayers to structure there tax affairs so as to 
reduce their tax liability seems to have been annihilated by the decision of the C: SARS v 
NWK
177
, therefore thwarting the taxpayer‟s hope of utilizing the loopholes of the tax statutes as 
permitted by law to reduce their tax liability. 
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 Chapter 4 
4 Comparative Jurisdictions 
Having established that tax avoidance affects many if not all jurisdictions other than South 
Africa, Australia and the United Kingdom will be examined to ascertain how these comparative 
jurisdictions have approached the challenges surrounding tax avoidance.  
Most common law jurisdictions such as Australia have enacted a GAAR to capture unacceptable 
tax avoidance behavior. It has also been established that most jurisdictions originally drew the 
principles of tax avoidance from the Duke of Westminster case, where it was pointed out by the 




This has made the tax systems of most of these world governments endemic in the United 
Kingdom tax system simply because these jurisdictions share a common heritage with the UK 
tax Jurisprudence. 
4.1 Australia 
Just like South Africa, Australia has in order to address the challenges posed by tax avoidance 
devised a statutory mechanism which is contained in the Australian Income Assessment Tax Act 
179
known as the GAAR.  
4.1.1 Background  
The Australian anti-avoidance rules were initially contained in section 260 of the Australian 
Income Tax Act and just like the South African section 103;- it proved ineffective to address tax 
avoidance related challenges. 
Section 260 was expressed in extremely broad language, such that it had practically 
inexhaustible application, operating to invalidate any transaction that produced a tax benefit
180
. 
Given that the legislature could not have purposefully intended to cancel all arrangements with 
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this effect, the courts desired to place reasonable limits on the operation of section 260
181
. To 
achieve this outcome, the courts interpreted the section using the choice principle. 
The purpose of the choice principle as established by the court was that section 260
182
 intended 
to safeguard the general provisions of the Act from vexation and not to oppose taxpayers any 
right of elect between alternatives which the Act itself affords them.
183
 
In view of the above section 260  proved to be ineffective to fight sophisticated tax avoidance 
schemes promoted by tax advisors
184
 resulting in it been repealed and replaced with Part IVA of 
the Income Tax Assessment Act, which subsequently came into effect on the 27
th
 May 1981. 
The introduction of Part IVA of the ITAA of 1936 was welcomed by the Treasurer, were it was 
stated that, it was introduced to: 
… Strike down blatant, artificial or contrived arrangements but not cast unnecessary 
inhibitions on normal commercial transactions by which taxpayers legitimately take 
advantage of opportunities available for the arrangement of their affairs
185
. 
It was also stated that Part IVA of the ITAA would not affect normal commercial transactions by 




The Income Tax Assessment Act of 1936 provides essential criterion to be met before the GAAR 
can be invoked on an arrangement. 
4.1.2 Features of the Australian GAAR 
The essential features for the application of the GAAR are that: 
 there must be a scheme;187  
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  which must give rise to a tax benefit;188 and that 
 Such a scheme must have been entered into for the sole or dominant purpose of 
obtaining a tax benefit. 
4.1.3 There must be a scheme 
The Australian Income Tax Act defines a ‘scheme’ as:
189
 
 Any agreement, arrangement, understanding, promise or undertaking, whether 
express or implied and whether or not enforceable, or intended to be enforceable 
by legal proceedings and; 
 Any scheme, plan, proposal, action, course of action or course of conduct. 
Australia uses the term „scheme‟, while in South Africa the term „arrangement‟ is used to bring 
out the elements that must be met for an arrangement to be categorized an impermissible 
avoidance arrangement. 
The inclusion of an „arrangement‟ or „part‟ of „arrangement‟ in section 80L
190
 and the express 
statement in section 80H
191
 that the Commissioner can apply the legislation to any „any steps in 
or parts of an arrangement‟ removes the need to consider the difficulty question under Part IVA 
whether the arrangement is a scheme or a mere sub-scheme.
192
 
It is further observed that the definite recollection in sub-section 80G (2)
193
 that it is sufficient 
under the South African GAAR if one part of an arrangement has the necessary predominant 
basis of obtaining the tax benefit, rather than demanding that the scheme in its entirety be 
distinguished, meaning that the subject of recognizing the true scheme is mainly worthless.
194
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It is not necessary for an „arrangement‟ in its entirety to be justified by a non-tax purpose, as 




Both the Australian and South African tax statute defines „scheme‟ and „arrangement‟ in a 
dissimilar manner. For instance Subsection 177A (3)
196
 provides that a „scheme‟ includes 
unilateral scheme, plan, proposal, action, course of action or course of conduct, while the latter 
provides that an „arrangement‟ includes any operation, transaction, scheme…  
In FCT v Peabody
197
, the term „scheme‟ was interpreted by demanding that the attributes that 
comprises the professed scheme must be capable of standing on their own without being 
dispossessed of all actual interpretation. The consequence of this precondition is that the weaker 
the authentic arrangement appears to be; the less likely it will be capable of standing on its own 
in line with the set test by the High Court
198
. 
To determine what a „scheme‟ is as per the provisions of Part IVA the court will look at the 
circumstances surrounding each case on a case by case basis. 
In Spotless Services Ltd v FCT, in dealing with the definition of a scheme it was stated that a 
„scheme‟: 
… requires that the parties to the scheme, insofar as they are known, must be identified and 
in terms or content of any agreement, arrangement, understanding, promise or undertaking 
and the steps or stages of any course of action or proposal insofar as they are relevant, be 
identified. In addition, the courts held that „all the relevant facts had to be included in the 
relevant formulation before the factual scenario could be said to be capable of standing on its 
own and own and thus constituting a scheme
199
. 
Part II A of the ITA No. 58 0f 1962 only applies to part or parts of an „arrangement‟ and the 
Australian „capable of standing alone‟ principle is therefore not applicable under section 80L of 
the Act. 
In examining the „capable of standing alone‟ principle Callinan J noted that the Commissioner: 
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… cannot seize upon and isolate on event, or a series of events, which standing alone may 
appear to have a complexion which it or they cannot truly bear when other relevant 
connected events are taken, as they should be into account
200
. 
The exposition of the „capable of standing alone‟ test would appear immaterial to section 80L as 
section 80G, 80H and 80L Cleary provides that connected  attributes do not have to be contained 
in the specialty arrangement.
201
 
Section 80C (2) of the Act
202
 provides that, an avoidance arrangement lacks or is deemed to lack 
commercial substance, if the legal substance or effect of the avoidance arrangement as a whole is 
inconsistent with or differs significantly from the legal form of its individual step. 
Section 80L of the Act
203
 provides for an arrangement to include „all steps there in or parts 
thereof,  
And section 80G (2) of the Act
204
 provides that the „purpose of a step in or part of an avoidance 
arrangement may be different from a purpose attributable to the avoidance arrangement as a 
whole‟. To this end, no matter how legitimate the overall arrangement is, Part IIA will not be 
prevented from being applied if part of an arrangement was entered into for the sole or main 
purpose of obtaining a tax benefit
205
. This serves as an advantage to taxpayers because only part 
of an „arrangement‟ which falls short will be under attack and before the Commissioner attacks 
such an „arrangement‟; he is obliged to disclose exactly which part of the arrangement he is 
attacking. 
However section 177D of Part IVA cannot be applied to part of an „arrangement‟ which is 
alleged to be not genuine if the overall „arrangement‟ seems legitimate. This provision is applied 
to a „scheme‟ in its entirety and the determining factor is the dominant purpose underlying such 
an arrangement.  
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In Peabody v FCT, it was stated that: 
Where, as a matter of fact, a scheme consists of a course of action comprising several steps 
the Commissioner may [not] isolate out of that course of action one step and classify that as 
a scheme… [In] a case where a series steps constitutes, that whole series of steps is to be 
considered, the individual steps being seen as parts of the scheme rather than each step being 
capable of being seen as a scheme in itself
206
. 
Notwithstanding that the decision of the High Court was unanimous; the court was divided on 
the continued application of Part IVA, while the majority of the court accepted and applied the 
decision in the Peabody case. , the Judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ out rightly rejected its 
principles and this is seen as an outright shift away from the existing law, the decisions of 
Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Callinan JJ also represent a shift in the approach, this has been the 
perception of the courts
207
. 
 4.1.4 A scheme must have the effect of a tax benefit 
On establishing that a transaction entered into by a taxpayer is a „scheme‟ the next essential 
factor to be identified is that such a „scheme‟ gave rise to a tax benefit.  The definition of „tax 
benefit‟ under section 177C
208
 is extensive and includes among others, an amount not included in 
an assessable income, a deduction, incurral of a capital loss and the allowance of a foreign tax 
credit. 
Much as the definition seems to be exhaustive in nature, other tax benefits such as rebates and 
credit where not covered and such were not a concern of Part IVA. To secure rules on 
establishing whether a tax benefit has arisen or not, section 177C (4)
209
 was amended.  This was 
done so as to tighten the rules which determine when a tax benefit had been obtained. 
 Section 177C 
210
 is specific as to when, a taxpayer is deemed to have obtained a tax benefit. The 
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In the case of Peabody v FCT, both the Federal Court and the High Court held that: 
Section 177C (1) (a) desires a logical prospect, not a minimal likelihood, that the taxpayer 
would have gained a tax benefit but for the scheme
212
. It is further notable that, this test 
prescribes a forecast of occurrences that may have transpired if the scheme had not been entered 




Under Part IIA of the Act, there is no requirement for causal connection, all is needed is establish 
that there is a tax benefit. Upon establishing that a tax benefit has been obtained, there is a shift 
as to whether the sole or main purpose of the „arrangement‟ was to obtain a „tax benefit‟. 
Section 80E (1) (b) (i) of the South African Income Tax Act and section 177C (1)
214
  both contain 
the phrase „would have‟. 
Part IVA is much more specific and detailed compared to Part IIA and it is perceived that the 




4.1.5 Dominant Purpose  
The third element to be determined is that a „scheme‟ was entered into for a „sole‟ or „dominant‟ 
purpose of obtaining a tax benefit.  
The term „purpose‟ is described in section 177A (5) as: 
A reference in this part of to a scheme or part of a scheme being entered into or carried out by a 
person for a particular purpose shall be read as including a reference to the scheme or the part 
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of the scheme being entered into or carried out by the person for 2 or more purposes of which 
that particular purpose is the dominant purpose
216
. 
The general effect of section 177A (5) is that the „sole or dominant purpose‟ of entering into the 
scheme must have been to obtain a tax benefit
217
. It would appear that the pertinent justification 
need not be that of the person to derive the tax benefit
218
 and that it is not inevitable that the 
benefit obtained is the benefit desired to be obtained
219
. 
The third requirement is solely based on the eight elements as contemplated by section 177D of 
Part IVA. These factors or tests may be summarized as follows:
220
  
(1) the manner in which the scheme was implemented; (2) its form and substance; (3) the timing 
of the scheme (4) the result which would be achieved by the scheme but for Part IVA; (5) any 
change in the taxpayer‟s financial position as a result of the scheme; (6) any change in any other 
person‟s financial position; (7) any other consequences for the relevant taxpayer or any other 
person connected with the scheme; (8) the nature of the connection between or among parties to 
the scheme. 
Section 177D draws its principles from Lord Denning‟s Predication Test as set out in Newton v 
FCT
221
 were it was noted that: 
In order to bring the arrangement within the section you must be able to predicate by looking 
at the overt acts by which it was implemented that it was implemented in that particular way 
so as to avoid tax. 
If you cannot so predicate, but have to acknowledge that the transactions are capable of 
explanation by reference to ordinary business or family dealing, without necessary being 
labelled as a means to avoid tax, then the arrangement does not come within the section. 
Thus, no one, by looking at a transfer of shares cum dividend, can predicate that the transfer 
was made to avoid tax. Nor can anyone, by seeing a private company turned into a non-
private company, predicate that it was done to avoid Div. 7 tax, see W.P. Keigherry Pty Ltd v 
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Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 32 ALJR at 118. Nor can anyone, on seeing a declaration 
of trust made by a father in favour of his wife and daughter, predicate that it was done to 
avoid tax, see Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Purcell (1921) 29 CLR 464. But 
when one looks at the way the transaction were effected in Jacques v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation (1932) 48 CLR 548- the way the cheques were exchanged for like amounts and 
so forth there can be no doubt at all that the purpose and effect of that way of doing things 
was to avoid tax
222
. 
The prediction test was applied in FCT v Consolidated Press Holdings
223
  where it was 
established that the appropriate dominant purpose may be so recognizable on the evidence 
taken as a whole. 
In a more recent case FC T v Hart, a taxpayer borrowed money under a split loan facility, and 
put part of it to a private or domestic use and applied the balance to purchase an asset to be used 
for the purpose of gaining or producing assessable income. The loan agreement contained a 
condition that the borrower must „direct the application of the whole of the payments required 
under the loan agreement to the satisfaction of that part of the loan used for private or domestic 




The court held that the significance of the scheme was the borrowing of money for use in 
financing and refinancing the two properties on the terms of the „Wealth Optimiser‟ loan facility, 
and that the dominant purpose was to secure the acquisition or retention of the properties rather 
than the tax benefit.
225
 
It was however observed that the court‟s decision in the above case amplified the application of 
Part IVA past the requirements of the Act and by so doing; the High Court has set the magnitude 
for avoidance arrangements too low.
226
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A recognized tax benefit should not lead necessarily to satisfaction of the dominant purpose test 
and two concepts unfold from the Hart case to underpin this argument.
227
 The first point is that, 
when applying the section 177D (b) factors the High Court focused too much on the manner, 
form and substance criteria.
228
 




In reaching the decision, Hill and Hely JJ discerned and applied the perspective taken by the Full 
bench in Eastern Nitrogen Ltd v FC of T
230
 and in FCT v Metal Manufacturers Ltd
231
, where the 
assumption by business enterprises of lease finance transactions instead of money lending 
transactions in the literal sense was found to fall outside of the operation of Part IVA, and 
although one of the purposes of the taxpayer in each case was to obtain a tax benefit, the 
prevalent or most influential purpose of each taxpayer was to obtain a large financial facility on 
the best terms reasonably available
232
. 
The equivalent of section 177D of Part IVA in South Africa is section 80A which provides that: 
an impermissible avoidance arrangement exists where; the sole or main purpose of the 
avoidance arrangement was to obtain a tax benefit”
233
. 
As envisaged by section 80G
234
, a taxpayer obtaining a tax benefit must establish that, to a 
moderate or acceptable degree in light of the relevant facts and circumstances, the sole or main 
purpose of obtaining a tax benefit is not the main purpose of the avoidance arrangement.  
Under the repealed section 103, the onus was on the Commissioner to establish that all elements 
are present and once it was satisfied that the sole or main purpose was to obtain a tax benefit, and 
then the burden of proof shifted to the taxpayer
235
. 
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The above was criticized in that case law suggests that the taxpayer‟s ipse dixit may be 
inadequate to discharge the onus of proof
236
. With regard to Part IIA, the purpose test is when 
the arrangement was implemented, whereas under Part IVA, the time for testing the dominant 
purpose is generally the time at which the scheme was entered into or carried out, and by 
reference to the law as it then stood
237
. 
In view of the decisions reached in Hart and Spotlight Stores, section 177D requires that, a 
person must have entered into the scheme with the sole or dominant purpose of obtaining a tax 
benefit for the taxpayer. The question posed under this provision is aimed at establishing the 
dominant purpose of the relevant person(s), not the dominant purpose of the scheme itself
238
. It is 
important to note that the person with the purpose need not be the taxpayer, in Vincent v FCT
239
 
and FCT v Sleight
240
, it was held that it is enough that the promoter of the scheme has a dominant 
purpose. 
Therefore if a taxpayer utilizes the services of a professional tax advisor, it matters not that the 
taxpayer did not have a purpose in relation to the scheme or part of the scheme, hence this will 
not prevent the operation of section177D.
241
  
Arrangements that lack commercial substance are listed in section 177D
242
 and in the case of 
South Africa they are listed under section 80C (2)
243
 
In the South African scenario, the factors that are indicative of a tax avoidance scheme are not 
supplementary to, but rather inter-connected with the question of whether the „sole or dominant 
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purpose was to enable the taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit
244
. Section 177D requires that an 
unbiased inference has to be drawn and not the taxpayer‟s genuine purpose. 
4.2 United Kingdom 
 The United Kingdom does not have a statutory mechanism known as the general anti-avoidance 
rules to help them combat tax avoidance. More recently the government asked Graham Aaronson 




The United Kingdom mostly relies on statutory provisions known as the Targeted Anti-
Avoidance Rules (TAARS) and judicial doctrines which have been developed over a period of 
time to combat tax avoidance. 
4.2.1 Statutory approach 
As established above, the United Kingdom does not have a GAAR in place to curb tax avoidance. 
The UK mainly relies on specific anti-avoidance rules as contained in various other statutes 
known as the Targeted Anti-Avoidance Rules to counter tax avoidance.  
In contrast to the GAAR, the TAARS are not contained in one single document but exist in various 
other statutes. It has been observed that TAARS have in effect embraced an equidistant road 
between the administering of the GAAR and the detailed technical provisions aimed at rebuffing 
every element of unacceptable tax avoidance
246
. 
In the Budget of 2008 it was announced that the HMRC was considering whether there might be 
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The main feature for most TAARs is the taxpayer‟s motive of entering into a transaction. 
Therefore, if a TAAR carries an „unallowable purpose‟ test, there are difficulty questions of 
construction to be contemplated by the taxpayer, such as working out which part or parts of 
commercial arrangements the TAAR applies to
248
. The test requires that the element of   „tax 
advantage‟ or „tax benefit‟ be satisfied, and that the taxpayer is left to come to a conclusion as to 
what their transaction should be compared with in order to establish whether such advantage or 
benefit has been obtained
249
. It has also been stated that the effectiveness of TAARs and the 




The TAARs are generally complex and raise a lot of uncertainties in the fight against tax 
avoidance. It is against this that the UK government appointed a committee in 2010 to conduct a 
study so as to establish whether the introduction of the general anti-avoidance rules will help 
solve this problem. 
4.2.2 GAAR v TAAR 
One notable feature as established above is that the GAAR is contained in one single document 
whereas the TAARs are contained in different statutes. The GAARs are all-embracing in nature 
aiming to encapsulate a wider domain of tax avoidance activities, whereas the TAARs are focus 
driven in nature and thus have a restricted application. 
251
.  
Despite the differences highlighted above, the TAARs and GAARs both have the same effect of 
combating tax avoidance.  
A well drafted GAAR which brings out what Parliament had intended is more likely to go a long 
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4.2.3 Judicial approach 
The courts in the United Kingdom have for long used the literal interpretation of statutes which 
is a more conventional approach to fighting tax avoidance. This approach requires that if a 
taxpayer‟s affairs fall outside the provisions of the relevant act, then he is not liable for tax.  
The courts approach is best demonstrated in the case of Partington v Attorney General
253
 where 
it was stated that: 
If a person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however 
great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the crown, 
seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is 
free, however apparently within the law the case might otherwise appear to be. In other 
words, if there be an equitable construction, certainly such a construction is not admissible in 
a taxing statute, where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute. 
The literal interpretation of statutes approach was mainly influenced because the courts did not 
want to tolerate the purposive interpretation of statutes particularly were tax anti-avoidance 
provisions are concerned. 
The insistence on the literal interpretation approach and the reluctance regarding the use of 
common law doctrines to bypass a literal interpretation was emphasized in IRC v Duke of 
Westminster
254
 and this principle formed the basis of the court‟s approach to tax avoidance cases 
for a very long time.   
 In the above case the House of Lords completely declined the economic substance doctrine, 
creating the impression that the statute can only apply if the taxpayer acts exactly as described in 
the text. It also denied the application of the business purpose test, hence permitting taxpayers to 
arrange their businesses with the proclaimed purpose of only reducing tax liability
255
. 
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The court‟s literal interpretation attitude was partly attributed to the fact that it did not see  as a 
law makes and was strongly of the view that the court‟s main responsibility is to bridge the 
lacuna of tax inconsistencies of the British tax system.  
256
 
With the progression of time the courts developed a change of attitude which saw a shift from 
the literal interpretation of statutes to a more purposive interpretation approach which resulted in 
Lord Wilberforce‟s decision in Ramsay 
257
 which became known as the Ramsay principle. The 
court established that:  
the courts are not confined to literal interpretation of tax statutes, and that they should 
consider for tax reasons the context, the scheme and purpose of an act, the court also 
established the nature of a transaction for tax purpose can be determined by a combination of 
more than one transaction
258
 
 Ramsay seems to be the trailblazer for the foundation in the United Kingdom of a judicially 
developed new approach to combat tax avoidance schemes. The courts have now adopted the 
view that while the techniques of tax avoidance are progressing and technically improving, the 
courts are not compelled to stand still
259
. 
In Floor v Davis
260
, also highlights a new approach the court, based on a purposive approach in 
that they must adopt a step by step approach in determining the tax consequences of the 
transaction and that the court must evaluate the transaction in its totality where a transaction was 
part of an entire composite whole.  
The Ramsay Principle was applied in Furness v Dawson
261
, where Lord Brightman noted that: 
The effect of his [Oliver L.J‟s] judgment was to change Lord Diplock‟s formulation from a 
pre-ordained series of transactions… into which there are inserted steps that have no 
commercial purpose apart from the avoidance of a liability to tax” to “a pre-ordained series 
of transactions… into which there are inserted steps that have no enduring legal 
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To this day the purposive interpretation approach has buried the literal interpretation approach 
and is still followed in the UK to attack tax avoidance schemes not addressed by fiscal 
legislation.  
In support of the purposive interpretation attitude it was noted that under this approach the court 
will verify whether the legal form of a transaction is equivalent to its economic substance.
263
 
In Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Limited v Mawson (Inspector of Tax),
264
  affirmed this 
new approach, and stated that the ethos of this approach was to bestow on the statutory provision 
a purposive construction or the „modern principle in construction‟ in order to establish the 
essence of the transaction to which it was preconceived to apply and then to resolve whether the 
real transaction responded to the statutory interpretation.
265
 It was further elaborated that this did 
not mean that the court have to place their reason into the straitjacket of first translating the 
statute in the hypothetical and then glancing at the facts.
266
 It was stated that it may be more 
appropriate to examine the facts and establish that they please the characteristics of the statute. 
However, one‟s perspective of the matter is to establish whether the applicable provisions of the 
statute upon its literal construction apply to the facts having been discovered.
267
  
The shift of the court‟s attitude has to an extent reduced the restriction which was previously 
placed on the interpretation of tax statutes and this has been seen as more effective way of 
fighting tax avoidance considering that the UK does not have a GAAR. 
4.2.4 General anti-abuse rule  
After the decision in Ramsay the courts enjoyed a wide discretion in curbing tax avoidance 
through the common law doctrines under the purposive approach to fiscal legislation.  




 Prebble, Z., Prebble, J. Comparing the General Anti-Avoidance Rule of Income Tax Law with the Civil Law 
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Bearing in mind that the new legislated GAAR may usurp what the courts in the UK consider 
unacceptable avoidance behavior, the danger that subsists is that the courts through common law 
doctrines have equipped themselves with capacity outstretching even past legislation
268
, a danger 
which has been recognized in South Africa subsequent to the NWK decision.
269
 
It is perhaps against this atmosphere that the study group gathered in 2010 to guide the UK 
Government on the prudence of launching a legislated GAAR in the UK fiscal statutes, opposed 
to introducing against such an all-embracing rule being legislated.
270
   
The study group advised against the introduction of an all-embracing spectrum rule being 
legislated and proposed the following as a substitute:  
I have concluded that introducing a broad spectrum general anti-avoidance rule would not be 
beneficial for the UK tax system. This would carry a real risk of undermining the ability of 
business and individuals to carry out sensible and responsible tax planning. Such tax 
planning is an entirely appropriate response to the complexities of a tax system such as the 
UK‟s… 
However, introducing a moderate rule which does not apply to responsible tax planning, and 
is instead targeted at abusive arrangements, would be beneficial for the UK tax system.
271
 
The rule so suggested is the „general anti-abuse rule‟ contrary to a broad spectrum „general anti-
avoidance rule‟. Following the proposed general anti-abuse rule  Lethaby indicated that this rule 
may go past catching the so-called „Category 1‟ arrangements (i.e. arrangements with the sole 
purpose of reducing a tax liability) and also capture „Category 2 & 3‟ arrangements (respectively 
arrangements with the main purpose to obtain a tax benefit, but which also has a commercial 
purpose and arrangements with a predominant  commercial purpose but which also encompass 
an element designed to counterbalance  certain tax effects).
272
  
Nonetheless, in the absence of the broad spectrum general anti-avoidance rule and or the general 
anti-abuse rule, the counter avoidance technique currently accessible at the hands of Her 
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Majesty‟s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) are:
273
 a purposive interpretation of tax statutes; 
specific anti-avoidance rules targeted at recognized areas of exposure in fiscal legislation; and 
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Chapter 5  
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusion 
This study has examined the statutory legislation ON and the judicial approach to tax avoidance 
in South Africa in comparison to the Australian and the United Kingdom tax system. This has 
been achieved by scrutinizing the general anti-avoidance rules (GAARS) and case law on tax 
avoidance. The study‟s main focus was to determine the position and point of view of the 
judiciary in the evolution of case law on tax avoidance and also to determine whether the 
presence of the GAAR has provided the much needed clarity, certainty and predictability in as far 
as the determination of acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance behavior is concerned. 
It has been established that complicated tax avoidance scheme are on the increase, and 
notwithstanding a notable progress in the legal philosophy on tax avoidance, it has also become 
increasingly difficult for law makers to predict schemes which amounts to unacceptable tax 
avoidance.  
In relation to section 260 of the Income Tax Assessment Act of 1936, Judge Murphy noted that 
the accumulation of creative intellect to circumvent revenue laws has repeatedly demonstrated 




Prior to the enactment of the current GAAR under Part II of the Income Tax Act, the courts had 
adopted a literal approach of interpreting tax statutes which favored taxpayers as seen in most 
cases which where decided under section 103
275
. The courts where seen to be more favorable to 
taxpayers than the fiscus and this was consequentially seen as been sympathetic to tax avoidance. 
Therefore following the decision handed down in Conhage section 103 was declared ineffective 
and was replaced with the current GAAR under section 80A -L
276
. 
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Henceforth  the attitude of the judiciary has shifted from a literal to a purposive interpretation of 
tax statutes, where the courts have become feisty through the adoption of common law doctrines 
in the fight against tax avoidance as displayed in Ramsay in the UK,
277
 and the South African 
Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 
v NWK Limited
278
practically eradicating the long –established judicial principle that a taxpayer 
can structure there tax affairs in a legal manner so as to reduce their tax liability.
279
 
Considering the challenges of establishing with a degree of certainty as to when an 
„arrangement‟ or „transaction‟ will be considered acceptable or unacceptable tax avoidance 
behavior is a serious matter of concern. It has been demonstrated that the validity of the set of 
principles of law hinges mainly on the legitimacy of the series of actions and the modus operandi 
engaged by individual laws.
280
  
For the GAAR to be legitimate, it must satisfy the requirement of certainty as demanded by the 
rule of law. It has been established that certainty of laws presents legal subjects with the capacity 
to fulfill the law and the utmost liberty to act within the borderline set by the law makers.
281
 
Emphasizing on certainty, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs expressed the opinion that 




The Aaronson report underlined taxpayer certainty as a significant theme to be contemplated in 
drafting a suitable GAAR for the UK.
283
 
It is submitted that in the absence of certainty, taxation is unpredictable. For certainty of taxation 
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Having examined the challenges faced on the issue of tax avoidance in as far as determining 
„arrangements‟ or „transactions‟ which fall within acceptable or unacceptable tax avoidance 
behavior. It is suggested that more research should be conducted in the area of tax avoidance.  
It is apparent that NWK has attracted a lot of pronouncements and criticisms. Emslie indicated 
that while we are under the impression that the effect of the NWK was flawless, due to the effect 
of confusion, we respectfully query whether there was any true sham at all…
285
 
NWK decision will moving forward undoubtedly determine how taxpayers and the revenue 
authority examine arrangements entered into for their own commercial reasons.
286
 
Taking into account that the tax terrain has changed it is recommended that the judiciary should 
recognize the uncertainty concerning sham transactions and address the issue by determining the 
right position in as far as sham transactions are concerned.  
The statutory GAAR should bring out beforehand all characteristics that stipulate that an 
arrangement is an avoidance arrangement, and that the contrast between avoidance and 
mitigation should not be brought out by way of makeshift judgments on a case-by-case basis, but 
by mention of comprehensible and logical general principles which can be applied time and 
again by taxpayers, revenue authorities and the courts.
287
 
Having established that a law with a high degree of certainty is a law that guides conduct, it is 




Finally, it is also recommended that a GAAR should only apply where the arrangement entered 
into with respect to specific objective elements contained within the statute, is deemed to 
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misapply or abuse the provision depended upon as this perspective is favored over leaving the 
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